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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held in Medical Staff of
Avera Marshall Regional Medical Center v. Avera Marshall that medical
staff bylaws constitute an enforceable contract between a hospital
1
and its medical staff. Finding no preexisting duties, the majority
†
JD Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2017; BA English, Saint
Olaf College, 2014. I would like to extend special thanks to Debra Hsu, for the
countless hours she spent listening to my ideas and supporting me through this
process.
1. Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall (Avera
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determined that medical staff bylaws hold sufficient consideration
2
to create an enforceable contract.
This case note begins by exploring contract formation in
general and the history of construing medical staff bylaws as
3
contractual obligations. Then, it discusses the facts of Avera
Marshall, the rationale of the majority, and the rationale of the
4
dissent. Next, it argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court failed
to accurately discern both a lack of consideration, as well as mutual
5
assent that should have precluded the formation of a contract.
Finally, this note raises several public policy concerns that the
majority opinion overlooked and concludes that Avera Marshall may
6
stifle hospital boards’ future attempts to resolve staffing conflicts.
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A.

Contract Formation in General

The formation of a contract requires three elements: (1) a
manifestation of mutual assent, (2) an exchange of bargained-for
7
promises, and (3) consideration. Mutual assent is a “meeting of
8
the minds concerning [a contract’s] essential elements.”
Expressions of mutual assent are assessed under an objective
9
standard. It is well settled that mutual assent is lacking where one
10
party expresses a clear intent to not be bound by the agreement.

Marshall IV), 857 N.W.2d 695, 703–04 (Minn. 2014).
2. Id.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part IV.A–.B.
6. See infra Parts IV.C–.D, V.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
8. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795
N.W.2d 855, 864 (Minn. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Minneapolis
Cablesystems v. City of Minneapolis, 299 N.W.2d 121, 122 (Minn. 1980)).
9. Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 532, 117 N.W.2d 213, 221
(1962) (“Expressions of mutual assent, by words or conduct, must be judged
objectively, not subjectively.”).
10. See Hamilton v. Boyce, 234 Minn. 290, 292, 48 N.W.2d 172, 174 (1951)
(“No contract is formed by the signing of an instrument when the offeree is aware
that the offerer does not intend to be bound by the wording in the instrument.”
(citing Tyra v. Cheney, 129 Minn. 428, 152 N.W. 835 (1915))); Wells Constr. Co. v.
Goder Incinerator Co., 173 Minn. 200, 205, 217 N.W. 112, 114 (1927) (holding
that no contract was created when one party did not intend to be bound).
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“Consideration requires that one party to a transaction voluntarily
assumes an obligation on the condition of an act or forbearance by
11
the other party.” However, it is plainly established that a promise
to do something that one is already legally obligated to do does not
12
constitute consideration.
B.

Medical Staff Bylaws in General

Under Minnesota Administrative Rule 4640.0800, any hospital
used by two or more health practitioners is required to organize its
13
practitioners into a medical staff. The medical staff oversees the
14
clinical and scientific work of the hospital. Minnesota law also
requires the medical staff to “adopt bylaws, rules, regulations, and
15
policies for the proper conduct of its work.” From this statutory
obligation springs a set of rules and regulations commonly referred
16
to as medical staff bylaws. In their most basic form, medical staff
bylaws outline the organizational and governing structure of the
medical staff within the hospital’s broader institutional
17
framework. Generally, the bylaws determine the procedural
relationship between physicians and the hospital regarding

11. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 578 N.W.2d 752, 754
(Minn. 1998); see also Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 258 Minn. 533, 539, 104
N.W.2d 661, 665 (1960) (“Consideration . . . insures that the promise enforced as
a contract is not accidental, casual, or gratuitous, but has been uttered
intentionally as the result of some deliberation, manifested by reciprocal
bargaining or negotiation.”).
12. See Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima, 372 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. 1985)
(stating the common law rule that a promise to do what one is already legally
obligated to do is insufficient consideration); Hilde v. Int’l Harvester Co., 166
Minn. 259, 260, 207 N.W. 617, 618 (1926) (recognizing that a promise to perform
a prior legal obligation was “a mere naked promise” and did not constitute
consideration).
13. MINN. R. 4640.0800, subpart 2 (2013). Generally, a hospital’s medical
staff consists of “fully licensed physicians and may include other licensed
individuals permitted by law and by the hospital to provide patient care services
independently in the hospitals.” Craig W. Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review of
Hospitals’ Physician Credentialing and Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 604
(2000) (footnote omitted).
14. MINN. R. 4640.0800, subpart 1.
15. Id. R. 4640.0800, subpart 2.
16. See id.
17. See JAMES T. O’REILLY, JOLENE SOBOTKA & PHILIP HAGAN, A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE TO HOSPITAL LIABILITY 18 (2011).
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physician credentialing and the granting or revoking of clinical
18
privileges.
In this context, clinical “privileges” are the right of individual
physicians to admit their patients to specific hospitals and
19
administer care within that hospital.
The most common
relationship between hospitals and physicians involves the
physicians as independent contractors who are granted privileges
20
to admit and care for patients at a specific hospital. In Minnesota,
all patients admitted to a hospital must be placed under the care of
21
a member of the hospital’s medical staff. Thus, any physician
granted privileges at a Minnesota hospital is, by definition, a
member of the medical staff and subject to all of the rights and
22
obligations that status entails.
C.

Medical Staff Bylaws as Enforceable Contracts

A majority of courts have determined “that a hospital’s medical
staff bylaws . . . [constitute] a binding contract between the hospital
23
and its medical staff . . . .” These courts have generally been
influenced by a concern that such bylaws would be meaningless if
24
hospitals were not legally bound by them. Countering this
concern is an equally significant public interest in allowing
hospitals free discretion to address medical staff issues that may
25
affect the standard of patient care. Thus, a number of courts have

18. Id. (“Bylaws include, e.g., what doctors can be credentialed, and what
qualifications for requisite licensure, training, skill, and experience will have to be
met and documented. Through medical staff policies, the medical staff sets
criteria for conducting personnel evaluation, which is also known as the
credentialing process.”).
19. See id.
20. Id. at 18–19.
21. MINN. R. 4640.0800, subpart 3.
22. O’REILLY, SOBOTKA & HAGAN, supra note 17, at 18–19.
23. Dallon, supra note 13, at 640 n.288 (listing cases that held medical staff
bylaws were enforceable contracts).
24. See, e.g., Bouquett v. St. Elizabeth Corp., 538 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ohio 1989)
(“The cases holding that a hospital is bound by its staff bylaws base their decisions
on the reasoning that if the hospital is not bound by the bylaws, then essentially
the bylaws would be meaningless.”).
25. See Zipper v. Health Midwest, 978 S.W.2d 398, 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(expressing concern that enforcing medical bylaws as a contract could cause a
hospital’s concern of potential liability to “unduly impugn a hospital’s actions in
terminating the privileges of a physician providing substandard patient care”).
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also held that medical staff bylaws do not constitute an enforceable
26
contract.
The most common ground for rejecting medical staff bylaws is
27
a lack of consideration. Often this perceived lack of consideration
results from a preexisting duty under state law to adopt medical
28
staff bylaws.
However, some courts consider all of the
circumstances surrounding the hospital-physician relationship
29
when determining the existence of a contract. Such courts
acknowledge a hospital’s preexisting legal obligation to establish
medical staff bylaws but consider the question of consideration
under the hospital’s discretionary decision to grant privileges to
30
individual physicians. Essentially, the consideration in question is
not the bylaws themselves, but rather the individualized granting of
31
privileges to a specified physician. While the hospital does have a
statutory obligation to create and maintain medical staff bylaws, it
does not have an obligation to grant clinical privileges to any

26. See Dallon, supra note 13, at 641 n.290 (listing cases that have declared
that medical staff bylaws are not an enforceable contract).
27. See, e.g., Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 1001–02
(N.D. Ga. 1992) (concluding that bylaws could not constitute a contract due to a
lack of consideration); Zipper, 978 S.W.2d at 416 (holding that bylaws lacked the
consideration required to form a contract).
28. See, e.g., Kessel v. Monongalia Cty. Gen. Hosp. Co., 600 S.E.2d 321, 326
(W. Va. 2004) (finding consideration lacking where a hospital had a preexisting
duty under state law to adopt medical staff bylaws); see also O’Byrne v. Santa
Monica-UCLA Med. Ctr., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“[State
regulations] required the Medical Center to appoint a medical staff, they required
the medical staff to adopt bylaws, and they required the medical staff to abide by
those bylaws. Clearly . . . neither the Medical Center nor plaintiff conferred on the
other any more than what was required by law.”).
29. See Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 557 A.2d 1249, 1254 (Conn. 1989)
(holding that extending privileges to a physician was something beyond what a
hospital was already bound to do and that the physician’s return promise to abide
by medical staff bylaws constituted adequate consideration); Virmani v.
Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 488 S.E.2d 284, 288 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding a contract by comparing a doctor’s relationship with a hospital before
and after joining its staff).
30. See, e.g., Virmani, 488 S.E.2d at 288 (acknowledging statutory
requirements for staff bylaws as a preexisting duty but holding that when “a
hospital offers to extend a particular physician the privilege to practice medicine
in that hospital it goes beyond its statutory obligation”).
31. Id.
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32

individual physician. Thus, it follows that there is no preexisting
33
duty that would otherwise preclude the element of consideration.
Some jurisdictions that reject such arguments, finding no
contractual consideration in medical staff bylaws, concede that the
bylaws may yet form contractual rights where the bylaws contain
34
language expressing the rights of medical staff under the bylaws.
Other jurisdictions reject medical staff bylaws as enforceable
contracts but acknowledge that those same bylaws may be judicially
35
enforceable despite their lack of contractual status. Indeed, in
Robles v. Humana Hospital Cartersville, the Northern District of
Georgia expressly denied that medical staff bylaws create
contractual rights but subsequently concluded that the bylaws at
36
issue were nonetheless judicially enforceable. The court reasoned
that the “legislature would not have mandated that the hospital
create these procedures, if the legislature had not intended that
32. See, e.g., Gianetti, 557 A.2d at 1254 (“It can hardly be said that the hospital
must extend privileges to every physician who seeks them.”); Virmani, 488 S.E.2d at
288 (“When, however, a hospital offers to extend a particular physician the
privilege to practice medicine in that hospital it goes beyond its statutory
obligation.”).
33. Gianetti, 557 A.2d at 1255 (finding valid consideration where “[t]he
hospital changed its position by granting medical staff privileges and the plaintiff
physician [had] likewise changed his position in doing something he was not
previously bound to do, i.e., to ‘abide’ by the hospital medical staff bylaws”);
Virmani, 488 S.E.2d at 288 (“If the offer is accepted by the physician, the physician
receives the benefit of being able to treat his patients in the hospital and the
hospital receives the benefit of providing care to the physician’s patients. . . .
[T]hese benefits constitute sufficient and legal consideration . . . .”).
34. See Mason v. Cent. Suffolk Hosp., 819 N.E.2d 1029, 1032 (N.Y. 2004)
(stating that the court would enforce medical staff bylaws as a contract if clearly
written, but concluding that the bylaws in the case before it formed no such
contract); Holt v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 590 N.E.2d 1318, 1322
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (“[Medical] staff bylaws constitute a binding contract ‘only
where there can be found in the bylaws an intent by both parties to be bound.’”
(quoting Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985))).
35. See Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 1002 (N.D.
Ga. 1992) (“[T]his Court concludes that . . . the hospital bylaws, by themselves, do
not constitute a contract per se between the hospital and the doctors. . . .
[H]owever, . . . the hospital is bound by the bylaws it does create and . . . the Court
can enjoin the hospital to follow those procedures.”); Egan v. St. Anthony’s Med.
Ctr., 244 S.W.3d 169, 174 (Mo. 2008) (holding that no contractual obligation
arises from medical staff bylaws but a hospital is nevertheless bound to act in
accordance with its bylaws insofar as the bylaws are required under a regulatory
scheme).
36. 785 F. Supp. at 1002.
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the hospital follow the procedures once they were implemented.”
According to the court, although a preexisting statutory duty
precluded contract formation, that same statutory duty obligated
the hospital to abide by its own bylaws and thereby empowered the
38
court to enjoin the hospital to act on its obligation. Importantly,
this limited judicial review only pertained to a reinstatement of
39
privileges or an injunction. Therefore, a plaintiff could not
40
recover damages under the medical staff bylaws.
In Egan v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center, the Supreme Court of
Missouri followed a similar reasoning to Robles, holding that the
public policy behind the governing regulation empowered the
court to provide injunctive relief to a plaintiff-physician seeking
41
enforcement of a hospital’s medical staff bylaws. The court
specifically noted that “[a] hospital’s obligation to act in
accordance with its bylaws . . . is independent of any contractual
42
obligation the hospital may have to the doctor.” Additionally, the
court emphasized that “the purpose of the regulation is to
implement a system of medical staff peer review, rather than
43
judicial oversight . . . .” Despite the court’s limited judicial review
of the hospital’s actions, the final authority regarding medical
staffing decisions remains indisputably in the hands of the
44
hospital’s governing body. According to the court, this distinction
arises from the underlying notion behind the regulatory scheme,
which assumes that medical professionals are best qualified to
45
police themselves. Thus, any judicial oversight exercised under
the court’s ruling may seek only to ensure substantial compliance
with the hospital’s bylaws rather than questioning the merits of a
46
hospital’s staffing decisions.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (denying the plaintiff’s claim because he only sought damages rather
than reinstatement or injunction).
41. Egan, 244 S.W.3d at 173–74 (stating that the public policy behind the
regulation protects both patients and “physicians improperly subjected to
disciplinary action” (citation omitted)).
42. Id. at 174.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing the language of the governing state statute in support of its
conclusion).
46. Id.
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Medical Staff Bylaws and Contractual Rights in Minnesota

Although Minnesota law has never explicitly recognized
medical staff bylaws as an enforceable contract, in 1977 the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Campbell v. St. Mary’s Hospital implied
47
that an enforceable contract may arise from medical staff bylaws.
In Campbell, the court considered the narrow question of whether a
surgeon had been afforded proper due process in the revocation of
48
his medical privileges at St. Mary’s Hospital. Engaging in a twofold
analysis, the court first assessed possible due process claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and, in
dismissing the constitutional questions, subsequently examined the
plaintiff’s due process rights as established under the medical staff
49
bylaws of St. Mary’s Hospital.
First, the court questioned the applicability of constitutional
50
due process to the plaintiff’s claims. Due to St. Mary’s Hospital’s
status as a private hospital, rather than a public one, the potential
51
application of constitutional protections was not readily apparent.
The court briefly discussed an “entanglement” theory implemented
by some jurisdictions wherein private hospitals receiving sufficient
federal funds may be subject to Fourteenth Amendment
52
requirements. However, due to the lack of meaningful facts in the
record for determining the degree of entanglement, the court
refused to consider the constitutional question and did not directly
53
adopt or reject the entanglement theory.
47. 312 Minn. 379, 388, 252 N.W.2d 581, 587 (1977) (affirming summary
judgment against a doctor’s breach of contract claim because “under the bylaws
plaintiff was afforded a full measure of his contractual due process rights at every
stage of the proceedings to revoke his surgical privileges . . . .”).
48. Id. at 384, 252 N.W.2d at 584–85.
49. Id. at 386–87, 252 N.W.2d at 586.
50. Id. at 384, 252 N.W.2d at 585 (stating that constitutional due process
would only apply “if the actions to terminate plaintiff’s surgical privileges were
done under color of state law”).
51. Id. at 385, 252 N.W.2d at 585 (“While there is no doubt that the
operation of a public hospital would constitute state action, the issue becomes
considerably more complex when considering the activities of hospitals which, like
St. Mary’s, are wholly private.”).
52. Id. (citing Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963)).
53. Id. at 386, 252 N.W.2d at 586 (“Since it would be mere conjecture for us
to presuppose that such an entanglement existed, we review the revocation of
plaintiff’s privileges apart from any constitutional considerations.”).
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Following the court’s refusal to apply Fourteenth Amendment
considerations to the plaintiff’s claim, the court examined the
plaintiff’s due process rights under St. Mary’s Hospital medical staff
54
bylaws. Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts
of the case demonstrated that the plaintiff had received the full
scope of his due process rights as outlined within the medical staff
55
bylaws. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no violation
of the plaintiff’s due process rights when St. Mary’s Hospital
56
revoked his surgical privileges.
While the court in Campbell did not explicitly address the
contractual enforceability of medical staff bylaws, the specific
language of the opinion appears to imply the contractual nature of
57
such bylaws. The court’s specific recognition of the plaintiff’s
“contractual due process rights” under the medical staff bylaws
suggests that such bylaws may forge certain contractual
58
obligations. In the context of the plaintiff’s breach of contract
59
claim, however, such language may simply indicate the particular
legal contours of an isolated case. Indeed, although the court did
not challenge the plaintiff’s claim that his due process rights were
contractual in nature, there was no need to make such a challenge
as the facts of the case indicate that, regardless of the specific
nature of the plaintiff’s rights, all due process procedures
60
established by the medical staff bylaws were properly followed.
Thus, the court needed not, and did not, directly address the
question of whether the bylaws constitute an enforceable contract.
In fact, a careful reading of the court’s opinion reveals a narrow
resolution of the dispute predicated on the hospital’s proper
adherence to the due process procedure as required by the medical
61
staff bylaws.
Given the court’s narrow resolution in Campbell, the
jurisprudential value of its ruling as applied to contractual

54. Id. at 387, 252 N.W.2d at 586.
55. Id. at 388, 252 N.W.2d at 587.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 380, 252 N.W.2d at 583.
60. Id. at 387, 252 N.W.2d at 586 (“We therefore hold that under the bylaws
plaintiff was afforded a full measure of his contractual due process rights at every
stage of the proceedings to revoke his surgical privileges . . . .”).
61. Id.
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enforceability of medical staff bylaws is arguably minimal. Although
the language of the opinion hints at an implied contractual status,
the contextual background of the decision limits the scope of such
an implication. Despite its narrow applicability, Campbell was the
last major Minnesota case regarding medical staff bylaws and
contractual rights prior to Avera Marshall.
III. THE AVERA MARSHALL DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedure

Avera Marshall Regional Medical Center is a non-profit
62
hospital located in Marshall, Minnesota. In accordance with Avera
Marshall’s corporate bylaws, Avera Marshall’s board of directors is
required to organize “a medical-dental staff under medical-dental
63
staff bylaws approved by the [board].” Under the bylaws, the
medical staff is primarily “physicians with admitting and clinical
64
privileges to care for patients at the hospital.” The medical staff is
internally represented by the Medical Executive Committee
65
(MEC), which acts on its behalf.
Prior to May 1, 2012, the medical staff bylaws stated that any
practitioner wishing to admit patients to the hospital first needed
66
to be a member of the medical staff. To become a member of the
medical staff, “a physician was required to agree to be bound by the
67
medical staff bylaws.” Under the bylaws, the medical staff was
granted authority, “[s]ubject to the authority and approval of [the
board],” to “exercise such power as is reasonably necessary to
discharge its responsibilities under these bylaws and under the
68
corporate bylaws of the Medical Center.”
Importantly, the medical staff bylaws also established the
69
amendment and repeal process for the bylaws. Under the medical
staff bylaws, amendments to or repeal of the bylaws could be
proposed by “the Chief of Staff, the MEC, the [executive] board, or
62. Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall, 857
N.W.2d 695, 696 (Minn. 2014).
63. Id. (alteration in original).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 696–97.
68. Id. at 697 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
69. Id.
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70

one-third of active medical staff members.” Specifically, section
17.2 of the former bylaws required that any proposed amendment
or repeal had to receive an affirmative vote by two-thirds of the
71
eligible medical staff members. Even with the approval of the
medical staff, any change recommended by the medical staff
72
required the executive board’s approval to become effective.
However, the bylaws remained silent with regard to whether
changes proposed by the board required the approval of the
73
medical staff. That being said, the bylaws plainly stated that the
amendment and repeal process remained “‘subject to approval by a
majority vote of [the board]’ and could not ‘supersede the general
authority of [the board] as set forth in its corporate bylaws or
74
applicable common law or statutes.’”
In 2012, Avera Marshall’s governing board announced its
intent to repeal the current medical staff bylaws and proposed a
75
revised set of bylaws. Although the board solicited input from the
medical staff, it refused to submit the proposed changes to the
medical staff for a vote in accordance with section 17.2 of the
76
bylaws. Disregarding the board’s refusal to submit the proposed
changes to a vote, the medical staff held a vote anyway, rejecting
both the repeal of the former bylaws and the implementation of
77
the revised bylaws.
Ultimately, the board’s unilateral revisions took effect on May
78
1, 2012. As a result, two individual physicians and the medical staff
as a whole filed a nine-count action against Avera Marshall seeking,
among other things, a declaration that the former medical staff
bylaws constituted an enforceable contract between Avera Marshall
79
and the medical staff. The medical staff “sought to enjoin Avera
70. Id.
71. Id. (“Section 17.2 of the bylaws specifically provided that, for the
purposes of enacting a bylaws change, the change shall require an affirmative vote
of . . . two-thirds of the Members eligible to vote.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (alteration in original).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (noting the medical staff’s invocation of section 17.2 of the former
bylaws as the basis for justifying a medical staff vote in spite of the board’s actions).
78. Id.
79. Recognizing the medical staff bylaws as an enforceable contract would
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Marshall from repealing the former bylaws and enforcing the
80
revised bylaws.”
The district court granted Avera Marshall’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that the medical staff bylaws did not
81
constitute an enforceable contract. Additionally, the district court
granted a second summary judgment motion, denying the medical
82
staff’s standing to sue as a group. Furthermore, the district court
concluded that Avera Marshall had the authority to unilaterally
modify the bylaws without the medical staff’s approval so long as
“[Avera Marshall] substantially complie[d] with the procedural
83
prerequisites contained in the Medical Staff Bylaws.”
Affirming the district court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
concluded that the medical staff bylaws did not constitute an
enforceable contract and that the medical staff lacked standing to
84
sue. Because the medical staff bylaws were not contractual, the
court of appeals also concluded that Avera Marshall had the
85
authority to unilaterally amend the laws. On appeal to the
Minnesota Supreme Court, the two primary issues argued were
whether the medical staff had standing to sue and whether the
86
medical staff bylaws constituted an enforceable contract.

mean that Avera Marshall’s unilateral amendment, in violation of the terms of the
medical staff bylaws, was a breach of the contract between the medical staff and
Avera Marshall and therefore judicially redressable by the court. See id. at 700
(“Appellants further argue that Avera Marshall was obligated to comply with the
terms of the bylaws and that Avera Marshall breached the former bylaws’
amendment and repeal provision by unilaterally modifying the bylaws.”). In
addition to a declaration of an enforceable contract, the medical staff also sought
to establish that the medical staff, as a body, had standing and the capacity to sue
Avera Marshall. Id. at 698.
80. Id.
81. Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Marshall (Avera Marshall
I), No. 42-CV-12-69, 2012 WL 5962355 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 24, 2012).
82. Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Marshall (Avera Marshall
II), No. 42-CV-12-69, 2012 WL 6755586 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 6, 2012).
83. Avera Marshall I, 2012 WL 5962355, at *2.
84. Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall (Avera
Marshall III), 836 N.W.2d 549, 562 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
85. Id. at 560.
86. Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d 695, 698–99 (Minn. 2014). This case note
will focus on the issue of contract enforceability. The majority held that the
medical staff had standing to sue because they satisfied the satutory criteria of
section 540.151 of Minnesota Statutes. See id. at 699.
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Regarding the enforceability issue, the primary question
revolved around whether the medical staff bylaws constituted
adequate consideration for the purposes of creating an enforceable
87
contract. The physicians and medical staff argued that the
requisite consideration was each physician’s agreement to be
bound by the bylaws in return for appointment to Avera Marshall’s
88
medical staff. Avera Marshall countered that adopting the bylaws
did not constitute adequate consideration because the hospital had
a preexisting legal duty to adopt such bylaws in accordance with
89
Minnesota Administrative Rules. Ultimately, the supreme court
reversed the court of appeals’ decision, holding that the former
medical staff bylaws constituted an enforceable contract and,
therefore, that Avera Marshall could not unilaterally amend the
90
bylaws.
B.

Rationale of the Minnesota Supreme Court Decision

The majority grounded its decision on two points of reasoning.
First, the majority reasoned that although Minnesota
Administrative Rules required the creation of medical staff bylaws,
91
they did not require the bylaws to contain any specific provisions.
Thus, the rules set only the minimum requirements for adopting
92
bylaws. Following this conclusion, the court stated that “[b]ylaws
which exceed the minimum standards required under state law
93
satisfy the consideration requirement.” Therefore, the court
concluded that although the hospital had a preexisting obligation
to adopt medical staff bylaws, that obligation was not dispositive
with regard to whether the adopted bylaws provided the basis for
94
an enforceable contract.
Second, because the hospital’s obligation to adopt medical
staff bylaws was not dispositive, the court then considered whether
87. Id. at 700.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also MINN. R. 4640.0800, subpart 2 (2013) (requiring that a
hospital’s medical staff shall “formulate and, with the approval of the governing
body, adopt bylaws, rules, regulations, and policies for the proper conduct of its
work”).
90. Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 704.
91. Id. at 702.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Dallon, supra note 13, at 647).
94. Id.

11 (Do Not Delete)

400

3/24/2016 7:58 PM

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:387

the specific facts of the case demonstrated suitable consideration
95
regarding the bylaws. The central point of the court’s rationale
was the hospital’s requirement that each physician agree to be
bound by the medical staff bylaws in return for clinical privileges at
96
the hospital. Importantly, the majority made the clear distinction
that the medical staff bylaws did not, in and of themselves, generate
97
adequate consideration. Rather, consideration arose because
“with the appointment of each member to the Medical Staff . . .
each member of the Medical Staff agreed to be bound by the
medical staff bylaws and Avera Marshall agreed to let each member
98
of the Medical Staff practice at its hospital.” The consideration
provided by each member of the medical staff was his or her
99
agreement to be bound by the medical staff bylaws. Avera
Marshall provided practicing privileges to each member in return
100
for his or her agreement to be bound by the bylaws. Since Avera
Marshall and the members of its medical staff both “voluntarily
assumed obligations on the condition of an act or forbearance on
the part of the other,” the requisite element of consideration was
101
satisfied.
Responding to the dissent’s claim that a preexisting legal duty
102
requires hospitals to impose and abide by medical staff bylaws,
the majority stated that, while Avera Marshall may have had a
preexisting duty to formulate medical staff bylaws, such a duty did
not translate to a preexisting legal duty to grant a particular
103
physician practicing privileges at its hospital. Thus, the court

95. Id.
96. Id. at 703.
97. Id. at 703 n.6 (“[C]onsideration does not exist simply because the
medical staff bylaws exist.”).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 703.
102. Id. at 706 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Medical Staff was bound by
law to formulate bylaws and Avera Marshall had a legal obligation to . . . also adopt
bylaws . . . . Consequently, the Medical Staff’s and Avera Marshall’s fulfillment of
their legal obligations . . . was simply the fulfillment of a preexisting legal duty
. . . .” (citation omitted)).
103. Id. at 703 n.6 (majority opinion) (“The dissent, however, fails to explain
how, before the appointment of each member to its medical staff, Avera Marshall
was under a preexisting legal duty to allow that particular physician to practice at
its hospital . . . .”).
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104

ruled that adequate consideration existed. In addition, the court
determined that the transaction involved a bargained-for exchange
of promises and mutual consent to the exchange because Avera
Marshall offered clinical privileges to each member of the medical
staff on the condition that they be bound by the medical staff
bylaws, and each member of the medical staff accepted the offer of
105
privileges and agreed to be bound by the bylaws. Therefore,
106
finding all of the requisite elements of a contract, the court
concluded that the medical staff bylaws constituted an enforceable
107
contract.
C.

Rationale of the Dissent

The dissent rejected the reasoning of the majority,
maintaining that the medical staff bylaws lacked consideration
because adoption of the bylaws was simply the “fulfillment of a
preexisting legal duty, and thus neither party conferred on the
108
other any more than what the law already required.” Although
the bylaws may exceed the minimum requirements of state law, the
dissent concluded that the bylaws lacked consideration because the
relevant Minnesota rule provides broad discretion for the medical
109
staff and hospital to formulate and approve the bylaws. The logic
follows that, given the broad discretion granted by the governing
state law, it is not clear how the medical staff bylaws exceed the
110
minimum requirements.
In addition, the dissent challenged the majority’s framing of
the argument in terms of consideration given to each individual
111
physician granted privileges by the hospital.
Despite the
104. Id. at 703.
105. Id.
106. Those elements are: (1) a manifestation of mutual assent, (2) a
bargained-for exchange of promises, and (3) consideration. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
107. Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 704.
108. Id. at 706 (Anderson, J., dissenting). The dissent also extended its
analysis by assessing that Avera Marshall had authority to unilaterally amend the
bylaws despite the lack of an enforceable contract. See id. at 709–11 (holding that
the broad discretion and final authority granted to the board of directors
permitted the unilateral amendment of the medical staff bylaws).
109. Id. at 706 n.7; MINN. R. 4640.0800 (2013).
110. Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 706.
111. Id. (pressing the acknowledgment by the majority that “members of the
Medical Staff had no ability to change or otherwise alter the bylaws” and stating
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majority’s insistence that consideration existed because “each
member of the Medical Staff agreed to be bound . . . and Avera
Marshall agreed to let each member of the Medical Staff practice at
112
its hospital,” the dissent contended that both parties were already
under “a preexisting legal duty to perform these functions, and
113
thus, there was no consideration.”
Furthermore, the dissent found that, even if consideration
114
existed, the contract was invalid because it lacked mutual assent.
There can be no mutual assent where one party clearly manifests
115
intent to not be bound by the present agreement. Thus, where
the language of the bylaws expressed a clear intent by Avera
Marshall to retain final authority over the hospital and medical
staff, it is plain that the board did not intend to be bound by the
116
terms of those bylaws.
Additionally, the dissent argued that the medical staff bylaws
failed to clearly identify the parties subject to the alleged
117
contract.
The issue of party identification arises from the
ambiguity of the medical staff’s arguments, namely, who is the party
118
allegedly contracting with Avera Marshall? Is it the medical staff
as a whole, or is it each individual medical staff member and Avera
119
Marshall? As the dissent stated, “The problem with the absence of
clearly identified parties is that we simply do not know, and cannot
know, whether an additional necessary component of contract
formation is present here: an objective manifestation of mutual
120
assent.” Given this ambiguity, the dissent contended that there
could not have been objective assent to the contract’s essential
121
terms. Even if the contracting parties were not ambiguous, the

that “[t]here is no evidence to support the conclusion that the medical staff bylaws
are supported by consideration regarding each individual medical staff member”).
112. Id. at 703 n.6 (majority opinion).
113. Id. at 706 n.7 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 707.
115. Id. (citing Hamilton v. Boyce, 234 Minn. 290, 292, 48 N.W.2d 172, 174
(1951); Wells Constr. Co. v. Goder Incinerator Co., 173 Minn. 200, 205, 217 N.W.
112, 114 (1927)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 708.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:2 (4th ed.
2008)).
121. Id.
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dissent argued that the bylaws could not constitute an enforceable
contract absent express language “stating that the provisions of the
122
bylaws are enforceable against the hospital.”
Following this conclusion that the medical staff bylaws do not
constitute a contract, the dissent addressed the final issue on
appeal of whether Avera Marshall’s governing board had the
123
authority to unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws.
Dismissing the appellants’ arguments, the dissent concluded that
Avera Marshall had the authority to unilaterally amend the medical
124
staff bylaws.
The dissent’s conclusion included two primary
arguments: (1) the corporate structure of Avera Marshall implied
that any authority granted to the medical staff was necessarily
derived from the ultimate authority of the governing board and the
125
corporate bylaws,
and (2) Avera Marshall’s authority to
unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws was expressly reserved
126
in the medical staff bylaws themselves. Thus, Avera Marshall’s
unilateral amendment of the medical staff bylaws violated neither a
contractual obligation nor the designated bounds of its authority
under its internal procedures.
Finally, the dissent appealed to public interest in allowing a
hospital’s board of directors to address problems within its medical
staff “by amending the medical staff bylaws, without fear of
127
prolonged litigation.”
Although a hospital board may not
necessarily make the correct decision, it must still be able to act
within its authority “when it has expressly reserved ultimate

122. Id. at 709.
123. Id. (“The appellants, representing the interests of the medical staff, argue
that Avera Marshall breached the medical staff bylaws by unilaterally changing the
bylaws over the objection of the majority of medical staff members.”).
124. Id. (“[U]nder the terms of Avera Marshall’s corporate bylaws and the
medical staff bylaws, the board of directors was authorized to unilaterally amend
the medical staff bylaws.”).
125. Id. (“Any powers supposedly granted to the medical staff under the
medical staff bylaws ‘must originate from, and be authorized by, the Board
pursuant to the Corporate Bylaws.’” (quoting Mahan v. Avera St. Luke’s, 621
N.W.2d 150, 155 (S.D. 2001))).
126. Id. at 711 (“[T]he authority to unilaterally amend the medical staff
bylaws, as stated in the corporate bylaws, was also expressly retained by Avera
Marshall in the medical staff bylaws.”).
127. Id. at 713.
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authority over the medical staff and determines that doing so is in
128
the best interest of the hospital and patient care.”
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Lack of Consideration

Generally, consideration requires one party to voluntarily
assume an obligation in return for an act or forbearance by the
129
other party. It is well settled that a promise to do something that
one is already legally obligated to do does not constitute
130
Accordingly, the majority erred when it
consideration.
determined that there was sufficient consideration to create an
enforceable contract between Avera Marshall and its medical
131
staff.
Under Minnesota law, a hospital is obligated to appoint a
132
medical staff. Furthermore, the medical staff is required by state
law to, “with the approval of the governing body, adopt bylaws, rules,
133
regulations, and policies for the proper conduct of its work.”
Justice Anderson, dissenting in Avera Marshall, correctly stated that
the rules impose an obligation on a hospital’s governing body to
not only appoint a medical staff but also adopt bylaws regulating
134
the conduct of that staff. Additionally, state law requires that “all
persons admitted to the hospital shall be under the professional
135
care of a member of the medical staff.”
Hence, physicians
administering care to patients at Avera Marshall are required by law
to be members of the medical staff and thereby subject to the
legally required medical staff bylaws.
The majority erroneously contended that the bylaws exceed
the minimum standards required by state law and therefore satisfy

128. Id.
129. See, e.g., U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 578 N.W.2d
752, 754 (Minn. 1998).
130. See, e.g., Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima, 372 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn.
1985) (“[I]f a party did or promised to do what he was already legally obligated to
do, there existed no sufficient consideration to support this new promise.”).
131. See Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 703 (majority opinion).
132. MINN. R. 4640.0700, subpart 2 (2013).
133. Id. R. 4640.0800, subpart 2 (emphasis added).
134. Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 706 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
135. MINN. R. 4640.0800, subpart 3.
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136

the consideration requirement. However, the broad discretion
granted to the medical staff in adopting appropriate bylaws
obscures how exactly the bylaws could exceed the minimum
requirements. Likewise, the inability of the majority to indicate any
specific means of exceeding the minimum requirements supports
137
the conclusion that its holding was erroneous.
Another argument is that consideration arises from the
hospital’s granting of clinical privileges in return for a physician’s
138
promise to be bound by the medical staff bylaws. However, this
argument overlooks the fact that Avera Marshall is obligated to
139
appoint a medical staff and legally required to place all admitted
140
patients “under the professional care of . . . the medical staff.”
These requirements, paired with the legal obligation to adopt
141
bylaws governing the designated medical staff, demonstrate a
142
plain preexisting duty negating any claim of consideration. State
law already requires physicians to abide by the medical staff
143
bylaws. Furthermore, despite its discretion in granting privileges,
Avera Marshall has no discretion in applying the medical staff
144
bylaws to individual physicians. All physicians treating patients in
the hospital must be members of the medical staff, and all
136. Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 702 (majority opinion) (“[B]ylaws which
exceed the minimum standards required under state law satisfy the consideration
requirement.” (alteration in original) (quoting Dallon, supra note 13, at 647)).
137. Cf. O’Byrne v. Santa Monica-UCLA Med. Ctr., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 584
(Ct. App. 2001) (“Plaintiff does not explain precisely how the Bylaws are more
expansive and comprehensive than those provided for by law, in light of the broad
discretion given the medical staff to adopt appropriate bylaws.”).
138. Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 703 (“[F]ocusing solely on Avera
Marshall’s preexisting duty to adopt medical staff bylaws completely ignores the
fact that, before a doctor can be granted privileges at the hospital, the doctor must
agree to abide by the medical staff bylaws.”).
139. See MINN. R. 4640.0700, subpart 2.
140. Id. R. 4640.0800, subpart 3.
141. Id. R. 4640.0800, subpart 2.
142. O’Byrne, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 583 (finding no consideration where state
law required a medical center to appoint medical staff, required medical staff to
adopt bylaws, and required medical staff to abide by those bylaws).
143. See MINN. R. 4640.0800, subparts 1–2. By requiring medical staff to adopt
bylaws governing the “proper conduct of its work,” the statute implicitly requires
them to abide by said bylaws. Id.
144. See id.; see also Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Minn. 2014)
(“Avera Marshall maintains that it adopted the medical staff bylaws because it had
a preexisting legal duty to do so under Minnesota administrative rules and Avera
Marshall’s own bylaws.”).
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members of the medical staff must abide by the medical staff
145
Thus, physicians joining the medical staff have a
bylaws.
preexisting legal duty to abide by medical staff bylaws, regardless of
any specific request by Avera Marshall. In the face of a clear
preexisting legal duty, it is evident that the medical staff bylaws lack
the requisite consideration necessary to forge an enforceable
contract.
B.

Lack of Mutual Assent

Contract formation requires mutual assent among the parties
146
to the contract’s essential terms. Thus, where a party expresses
clear intent not to be bound by the terms of a contract, there is no
147
mutual assent. Specifically, where an element of mutual assent,
such as an offer, provides express language reserving an
unrestrained discretion to one party, a binding contract cannot
148
arise from it. Mutual assent and a party’s intent are assessed
149
under an objective standard.
One of the express purposes of Avera Marshall’s medical staff
bylaws is “[t]o provide a means whereby issues concerning the
Medical Staff and Medical Center [could] be directly discussed . . .
with the understanding that the Medical Staff [was] subject to the
150
ultimate authority of the Board of Directors.” Indeed, the explicit
language of the medical staff bylaws as they apply to the disputed
amendment and repeal process states that the entire process is
“‘subject to approval by a majority vote of [the board]’ and could
not ‘supersede the general authority of [the board] as set forth in
145. See MINN. R. 4640.0800, subpart 2.
146. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795
N.W.2d 855, 864 (Minn. 2011) (citing Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of
Health, 705 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Minn. 2005)).
147. See Hamilton v. Boyce, 234 Minn. 290, 292, 48 N.W.2d 172, 174 (1951)
(citing Tyra v. Cheney, 129 Minn. 428, 152 N.W. 835 (1915)) (holding that no
contract is formed where one party is aware that the other party does not intend to
be bound by the written instrument).
148. Grenier v. Air Express Int’l Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1201 (D. Minn.
2001) (finding no contract where an offer contained an express reservation of
discretion regarding the definition of a contractual term).
149. Anderson Mktg., Inc. v. Maple Chase Co., 241 F.3d 1063, 1063 (8th Cir.
2001) (applying Minnesota law); Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520,
532, 117 N.W.2d 213, 221 (1962).
150. Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Minn. 2014) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
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its corporate bylaws or applicable common law or statutes.’” This
plain language indicates an objective intent that Avera Marshall did
152
not intend to be bound by the bylaws. Furthermore, where the
medical staff bylaws, an alleged contract, unambiguously reserve
final authority in one party, it stretches the bounds of logic to claim
that such a party intended to be contractually bound by those
153
bylaws.
Considered in tandem with the general public policy
154
considerations present in this case, the express reservation of
discretionary authority by the hospital’s governing board supports
an unambiguous interpretation that no contract arises from the
medical staff bylaws. In fact, the governing board’s legal and ethical
responsibility to ensure high standards of patient care establishes a
clear contextual backdrop from which one may objectively
ascertain intent to retain discretionary control over the
155
administrative procedures of its medical staff. Sound case law,
express language, and contextual background all support the
conclusion that Avera Marshall manifested an objective intent not
to be bound by the medical staff bylaws.
Furthering such an interpretation is the fact that some courts
have distinguished between medical staff bylaws and hospital bylaws
created by the hospital’s governing board, noting that staff bylaws
156
may be less likely to create contractual rights. In this case, a level
of bifurcated authority is evident in the specific language of the
151. Id. (alteration in original).
152. Cf. Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)
(concluding that a hospital did not intend to be bound by staff bylaws where the
preamble of staff bylaws stated that the bylaws were “subject to the ultimate
authority of the applicable governing bodies”).
153. See id.; see also Talwar v. Catholic Healthcare Partners, 258 F. App’x 800,
805 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The self-declared purpose of the Bylaws and Credentials
Manual is to protect the best interests of patients, regulate activities of the medical
staff, and insure the provision of quality medical care for the hospital’s patients,
not to declare or create contractual rights of individual members of the medical
staff.”).
154. See infra Part IV.C.
155. See infra Part IV.C (exploring the law governing the liability of hospitals
for substandard patient care).
156. See Gonzalez v. San Jacinto Methodist Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 436, 438–40
(Tex. App. 1994) (holding that plaintiff-physician could not have vested rights
arising from medical staff bylaws); see also Tredrea v. Anesthesia & Analgesia, P.C.,
584 N.W.2d 276, 284–87 (Iowa 1998) (distinguishing hospital bylaws from medical
staff bylaws).
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bylaws, stating that the amendment and repeal process laid out in
the medical staff bylaws cannot “‘supersede the general authority of
157
[the board]’ . . . .” The language of the bylaws themselves directly
implies a two-tiered structure wherein the governing board
maintains control over and above the bylaws. Therefore, given the
express language of Avera Marshall’s medical staff bylaws and the
apparent intent not to be bound to the bylaws, the better holding
appears to be that there can be no mutual assent and thus no
158
contractual rights arising from the bylaws.
While the dissent did present a secondary argument contesting
the element of mutual assent based on the difficulty of identifying
159
the parties in the contract, that argument ultimately fell flat. The
dissent’s position hinged on the question of whether Avera
Marshall’s opposite party in the purported contract is the medical
160
staff as a whole or each individual medical staff member. Setting
aside the issue of whether the medical staff as a body has standing
161
to sue, the facts of the present case do not support the dissent’s
claim of party ambiguity. The facts evidence that, regardless of the
capacity or status of the medical staff as a whole, the purported
contract under dispute arose between Avera Marshall and each
individual member of the medical staff with privileges at the
162
hospital.
Avera Marshall offered the individual members
privileges as part of their agreement to be bound by the medical
163
staff bylaws.
In general, most jurisdictions acknowledge the
individual physician as an identifiable party when considering
157. Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Minn. 2014) (alteration in
original).
158. See Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)
(asserting that a trial court could reasonably conclude that staff bylaws did not
constitute a contract where the hospital expressed clear intent not to be bound by
the bylaws).
159. Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 708 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“There is
another problem with the appellants’ argument that the medical staff bylaws
constitute a contract—namely, who are the parties to the contract?”).
160. See id.
161. See id. at 700 (majority opinion) (recognizing the medical staff’s “capacity
to sue and be sued under Minnesota law”).
162. See id. at 702–03 (“The record in this case indicates that Avera Marshall
formed a contractual relationship with each member of the Medical Staff upon
appointment. Avera Marshall offered privileges to each member of the Medical
Staff, so long as the Medical Staff member agreed to be bound by the medical staff
bylaws . . . .”).
163. See id.
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164

medical staff bylaws as an enforceable contract. However, this
plain recognition of the individual physicians as parties to the
alleged contract does not preclude the ultimate conclusion that
165
consideration is lacking. As previously stated, the formation of a
166
contract requires both mutual assent and consideration. Thus,
although the parties may be readily identifiable, and assuming
167
arguendo the bylaws satisfy the element of mutual assent, a clear
168
lack of consideration may still preclude contract formation.
C.

Public Policy Considerations

Another pressing concern overlooked by the majority is the
potentially chilling effect that this ruling may have on the ability of
a hospital’s governing body to effectively manage its medical staff
169
and ensure optimal patient care.
Bearing the ultimate
164. See, e.g., Janda v. Madera Cmty. Hosp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1184 (E.D.
Cal. 1998) (compiling cases from across the nation and concluding that “the
majority of jurisdictions have held that hospital bylaws, when approved and
adopted by the governing board, are a binding and enforceable contract between
the hospital and physicians”); see also Williams v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 688 F.
Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (D. Nev. 2010) (“The physician makes an offer to become a
member of the hospital staff by applying for privileges at the hospital. The hospital
and staff accept that offer by granting the physician privileges.”).
165. See O’Byrne v. Santa Monica-UCLA Med. Ctr., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 584
(Ct. App. 2001) (acknowledging implicitly the status of an individual physician as a
party in an alleged contract formed by medical staff bylaws but finding no
enforceable contract for want of consideration); Egan v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr.,
244 S.W.3d 169, 174 (Mo. 2008) (finding no contract between individual physician
and hospital under medical staff bylaws due to lack of consideration from the
hospital, which had a preexisting duty under state regulation to conform to the
bylaws).
166. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
167. However, as addressed earlier, mutual assent is absent in this case due to
the express intent of Avera Marshall not to be bound by the medical staff bylaws.
See supra Part IV.B.
168. See supra Part IV.A; see also Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 701 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)) (“A contract is
formed when two or more parties exchange bargained-for promises, manifest
mutual assent to the exchange, and support their promises with consideration.”).
169. See Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 712–13 (Anderson, J., dissenting)
(“[A] hospital’s board of directors must be allowed to amend medical staff bylaws
when it has expressly reserved ultimate authority over the medical staff and
determines that doing so is in the best interest of the hospital and patient care.”);
see also Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Hospital Ass’n & American Hospital Ass’n
at 5, Avera Marshall III, 836 N.W.2d 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (No. A12-2117),
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170

responsibility for the quality of patient care,
the governing
authority of a hospital must be able to aggressively respond to
potential lapses in the quality of care provided by its medical
171
staff. Contrary to this necessity, the majority opinion generated a
potentially harmful expansion of a medical staff’s autonomy from a
172
hospital’s governing body.
Under Minnesota law, the hospital bears significant
173
responsibility for the safety and well-being of its patients.
Although individual physicians are certainly held liable for their
own negligent actions, hospitals may also carry independent
liability for their part in granting privileges to an allegedly
174
incompetent physician.
In light of the hospital’s substantial
liability in the event of substandard patient care, a reasonable
interpretation of the law concerning hospital administration and
accountability as applied in recent decades manifests public policy

2013 WL 10123966, at *5 (“Because hospital boards—not medical staffs—bear
ultimate responsibility for the hospital’s accomplishment of its mission, hospital
boards must be able to exercise their authority to meet that responsibility.”
(footnote omitted)).
170. See Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 313 (Minn. 2007) (recognizing
the tort of negligent credentialing and thereby holding that a hospital can be held
liable for substandard care arising from negligent monitoring of the competence
and conduct of physicians granted privileges by the hospital).
171. See DEAN M. HARRIS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE AND ETHICS
133–34 (2d ed. 2003) (“Human lives are at stake, and the governing board must
be given discretion in its selection so it can be confident in the competence and
moral commitment of its staff.” (quoting Sosa v. Val Verde Mem’l Hosp., 437 F.2d
173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971))).
172. See Brian M. Peters & Robin Locke Nagele, Promoting Quality Care &
Patient Safety: The Case for Abandoning the Joint Commission’s “Self-Governing” Medical
Staff Paradigm, 14 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 313, 317–18 (2010) (“[T]he notional
concept of medical staff ‘self-governance,’ or autonomy from the governing body,
too often results in a paralytic environment characterized by the governing body
either avoiding or inadequately pursuing aggressive compliance with
Quality/Safety standards.”).
173. See Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 313 (adopting common law claim of negligent
credentialing); see also Sylvester v. Nw. Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 387–
90, 53 N.W.2d 17, 19–21 (1952) (holding that a hospital owes a direct duty of care
to patients to protect them from harm by third persons); Mulliner v. Evangelischer
Diakonniessenverein of Minn. Dist. of German Evangelical Synod of N. Am., 144
Minn. 392, 394, 175 N.W. 699, 699–700 (1920) (recognizing the duty of a hospital
to provide its patients with as sufficient a number of attendants as the safety of the
patients may require).
174. See Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 313.
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considerations that strongly counter the conclusions of the majority
175
opinion. In so many words, the prevailing trend of hospital
liability demonstrates a purpose and intent to identify hospitals and
their administrative bodies as primary actors in credentialing
176
physicians and ensuring safe, quality patient care.
Yet, the
majority’s decision in the present case undermines this purpose by
potentially exposing hospitals to costly and disruptive litigation,
placing governing boards in a catch-22: either aggressively respond
to a physician’s ineffective care and face litigation from medical
staff members or handle ineffective physicians cautiously and risk
177
patients suing for negligent credentialing. By ruling as it did, the
majority put forth a body of law that, when viewed in its broader
context, simultaneously reproaches hospitals for failing to act
against incompetent physicians while restricting the means by
which hospitals may uphold their legal duty to act.
In ruling that the medical staff bylaws were an enforceable
178
contract, the majority decision effectively quashed the hospital
governing board’s ability to unilaterally amend the medical staff
bylaws and thereby reinforced an outdated model of medical staff

175. Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Hospital Ass’n & American Hospital
Ass’n, supra note 169, at 6 (“A decision in this case that diminished the authority
of a hospital board to manage the affairs of the hospital . . . would run contrary to
public policy regarding hospital administration and accountability as it has
developed over the last forty years.”).
176. The trend pervades not only Minnesota, but also the nation as a whole.
See, e.g., Fridena v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463, 466–67 (Ariz. 1980) (upholding the
liability of a hospital for negligent supervision of the competence of its medical
staff); Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 313; Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391, 395–96 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1980) (recognizing the duty of a hospital to “make a reasonable effort to
monitor and oversee the treatment which is prescribed and administered by
physicians practicing at the facility”); Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703,
708 (Pa. 1991) (adopting a doctrine of corporate negligence under which “the
hospital is liable if it fails to uphold the proper standard of care owed the patient,
which is to ensure the patient’s safety and well-being while at the hospital”);
Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168–70 (Wash. 1984) (holding that a hospital
owes an independent duty to patients to supervise the medical treatment provided
by members of its medical staff).
177. See Elisabeth Belmont et al., Quality in Action: Paradigm for a Hospital
Board-Driven Quality Program, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 95, 128–29 (2011)
(“Concern over the cost and disruption of such [physician] litigation can deter
hospitals that otherwise would be more proactive in taking action against
individual physicians based on quality concerns.”).
178. Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d 695, 704 (Minn. 2014).
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179

autonomy, a model which has been described as “a prohibitive
barrier to real progress in achieving a ‘zero-defect’ ‘safety
180
culture.’” Recognizing that one of the predominant goals of
hospitals is safeguarding a high standard of medical care within
their walls, multiple reformers have criticized the persistent model
of bifurcated hospital leadership for diminishing the capacity of
181
hospitals to effectively meet one of their driving objectives. In its
reasoning in the present case, the court revealed a distressing blind
182
spot to the broader implications of its ruling, particularly its
effect of stifling systemic innovations that could markedly improve
183
patient safety and quality of care.
Enforcing medical staff bylaws as a legal contract creates
another obstacle on the path towards an administrative model of
integrated executive authority that better ensures a high quality of
184
care. Threatened by possible litigation, hospitals may be hardpressed to take the necessary steps towards substantive change in
185
The unfortunate byproduct of such
executive structures.
hesitancy is that it may hinder hospitals’ adoption of integrated
governance models that can provide both higher quality and
186
higher efficiency in health care delivery.

179. Where the medical staff bylaws constitute an enforceable contract, the
hospital governing board is obligated to comply with the terms of the bylaws and
therefore cannot unilaterally amend the bylaws without breaching the contract.
180. Peters & Nagele, supra note 172, at 371.
181. See generally Belmont et al., supra note 177, at 108 (explaining that “[the
bifurcated] model can foster a diffusion of responsibility and accountability for
the quality of professional services”); Peters & Nagele, supra note 172, at 371–72
(outlining “viable alternatives” that are “free from the deep-seated conflicts and
performance barriers inherent in [the] bifurcated governance structure”).
182. See supra Part III.B (discussing the majority’s reasoning).
183. See Peters & Nagele, supra note 172, at 371 (“[E]mphasis on physician
autonomy and ‘self-governance’ seriously detracts from, and operates as a barrier
to, the industry’s overall move towards coordination and integration of care as a
way of producing both higher quality and greater efficiency in the health care
delivery system.”).
184. See id.
185. Id. at 367 (“[T]he threat of costly and contentious medical staff litigation
. . . frequently deters a fragmented hospital leadership from taking needed
disciplinary or corrective action.”).
186. See id. at 371 (crediting the international acclaim of high-achieving
healthcare systems to their successful integration of the physician, governing body,
and executive leadership into a unified, system-wide approach to quality and
safety).
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Thus, in addition to the issues of consideration and mutual
187
assent that already plague the majority opinion, the public policy
considerations underlying the case reveal a backdrop of law and
policy concerns directly countering the court’s decision. Bearing
such considerations in mind, the court’s ruling and the resulting
effect on the stated policy concerns are plainly erroneous and
contrary to sound judicial policy.
D.

Noncontractual Judicial Enforceability

Finally, although the medical staff bylaws may not be an
enforceable contract, whether the court may still have a limited
scope of judicial review independent of any contractual obligation
merits consideration. Some jurisdictions have determined that
medical staff bylaws, though not contractual, may still be subject to
188
judicial review. Such review is generally predicated on two public
policy arguments: (1) the legislature would not mandate that
hospitals create medical staff bylaws unless it intended for hospitals
to be bound by them; and (2) there is an implicit statutory purpose
not only to protect the well-being of patients, but also to protect
189
doctors from arbitrary disciplinary processes.
In those cases
where courts have granted judicial oversight, such review has been
notably limited, providing only sufficient injunctive relief to
compel hospitals to adhere to the procedures detailed in their
190
medical staff bylaws. The courts still recognize that the hospital’s
governing board, rather than the courts, retains ultimate authority
191
over medical staffing decisions. Thus, even those jurisdictions
that call for judicial review of medical staff bylaws explicitly
187. See supra Part IV.A–.B.
188. See Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 1002 (N.D.
Ga. 1992) (ruling that medical staff bylaws do not constitute a contract per se, but
hospitals may nonetheless be enjoined to adhere to their own procedures as
established in the bylaws); Egan v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 244 S.W.3d 169, 174
(Mo. 2008) (“A hospital’s obligation to act in accordance with its bylaws . . . is
independent of any contractual obligation the hospital may have to the doctor.”);
see supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
190. See Egan, 244 S.W.3d at 174 (“This Court, then, will not impose judicial
review on the merits of a hospital’s staffing decisions, but will act only to ensure
substantial compliance with the hospital’s bylaws.”).
191. See id. (“[I]t is clear that final authority to make staffing decisions is
securely vested in the hospital’s governing body with advice from the medical
staff.”).

11 (Do Not Delete)

414

3/24/2016 7:58 PM

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:387

recognize the hospital’s authority and notably restrict the scope of
192
the court’s decision.
In the present case, Minnesota law appears to strongly support
the position that the legislature would not mandate bylaws unless it
193
intended for the hospital to adhere to those bylaws. To rule that
statutorily mandated medical staff bylaws do not bind a hospital to
194
some degree would render the governing statute ineffective.
Thus, one may reasonably conclude that medical staff bylaws, by
virtue of their statutory requirement, may be judicially enforceable
where a hospital refuses to adhere to the procedures laid out in its
own governing bylaws.
Having affirmed that hospitals may be bound by the
procedures of their bylaws, the next question to ask is whether
Avera Marshall failed to abide by its own medical staff bylaws.
195
Tracking similar points as its argument against mutual assent, the
dissent correctly deduced that Avera Marshall did not breach the
196
medical staff bylaws by unilaterally changing the bylaws. In Mahan
v. Avera Saint Luke’s, the court emphasized that staff bylaws are
197
generally derived from corporate bylaws. Although not binding
in the present case, Mahan effectively illustrates the particular legal
relationship between corporate bylaws and staff bylaws:
Their legal relationship is similar to that between statutes
and a constitution. They are not separate and equal
sovereigns. The former derives its power and authority
from the latter. Hence, to determine whether the staff was
granted the power that it now claims to possess, any
192. See id.
193. See MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2) (2014) (“[T]he legislature intends the entire
statute to be effective and certain.”); see also Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 548
N.W.2d 281, 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (“We must also assume that the legislature
intended statutes to be effective and certain.” (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2)
(1994))), aff’d, 560 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 1997).
194. See Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 1002 (N.D.
Ga. 1992) (“The Georgia legislature would not have mandated that the hospital
create these procedures, if the legislature had not intended that the hospital
follow the procedures once they were implemented.”).
195. Specifically, the express reservation of ultimate authority is in the hands
of the governing board. See supra Part IV.B.
196. Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d 695, 711 (Minn. 2014) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting).
197. 621 N.W.2d 150, 155 (S.D. 2001) (“[A]ny powers supposedly granted
under the Staff Bylaws must originate from, and be authorized by, the Board
pursuant to the Corporate Bylaws.”).
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judicial analysis must begin with an examination of the
198
Corporate Bylaws.
As applied to Avera Marshall, this understanding of corporate
bylaws as the origin of powers granted under medical staff bylaws
supports the conclusion that the express language of the corporate
bylaws supersedes any implied authority generated in the medical
199
staff bylaws.
Therefore, where the corporate bylaws expressly reserve
200
ultimate authority in Avera Marshall’s governing board, it may
reasonably be concluded that medical staff bylaws lack the
authority to supersede the decisions of the governing board.
Additionally, the language of the corporate bylaws did not
specifically require approval from the medical staff for the
201
governing board to unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws.
This limitation on the medical staff’s power to oppose the
governing board, coupled with the broad power vested in the
board, further supports the conclusion that the governing board
acted within its authority under the corporate bylaws, and by
extension under the medical staff bylaws, when it unilaterally
changed the medical staff bylaws without a two-thirds vote from
202
voting members of the medical staff.
In conclusion, although Minnesota courts may indeed have
the power to enjoin hospitals to adhere to the procedures
established in their bylaws, the specific language of the bylaws in
the present case precludes the court’s judicial review. Avera
Marshall’s corporate bylaws expressly reserve ultimate authority to
the hospital’s governing board with regard to amending or

198. Id.
199. The explicit language of the medical staff bylaws themselves also supports
this interpretation. See Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 697 (majority opinion)
(noting that the amendment and repeal process “could not ‘supersede the general
authority of [the board] as set forth in its corporate bylaws or applicable common
law or statutes’” (alteration in original)).
200. See id. at 710 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“The Board of Directors shall
exercise oversight of the business affairs of [Avera Marshall] and shall have and
exercise all of the powers which may be exercised or performed by [Avera
Marshall] under the laws of the State of Minnesota, the Corporation’s Articles of
Incorporation, and these Bylaws . . . .” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
201. Id. (“Proposed bylaws, rules and regulations, or amendments thereto,
may be recommended by the medical-dental staff or the Board of Directors.” (quoting Avera
Marshall Corporate Bylaws § 15.3)).
202. Id. at 704.
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203

repealing the medical staff bylaws. Given this clear reservation of
authority, Avera Marshall reasonably adhered to the procedures of
its own bylaws when it unilaterally amended the medical staff
bylaws. Thus, where the governing board does not exceed its
authority, the court has no grounds for granting injunctive relief.
V. CONCLUSION
Avera Marshall presented the Minnesota Supreme Court with
the novel question of determining whether medical staff bylaws
could constitute an enforceable contract between a hospital and its
204
medical staff. The court incorrectly held that there was suitable
205
consideration in the bylaws to form a contract. The majority
failed to closely analyze the governing state law and accurately
identify the preexisting legal duties that precluded consideration.
Furthermore, the majority’s misinterpretation of the express
language of the bylaws led it to incorrectly conclude that the
206
defendant intended to be bound by the bylaws. This ruling may
pose trouble in the future by limiting hospitals’ abilities to resolve
207
staffing concerns by amending medical staff bylaws.
Minnesota contract law and sound public policy both support
a finding contrary to the unfortunate ruling of the majority
208
opinion. A better conclusion would be that the medical staff
bylaws do not constitute an enforceable contract under Minnesota
law and the hospital’s governing body is within its rightful authority
to unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws where such authority
has been expressly reserved.

203. Id. at 697 (majority opinion) (“[T]he amendment and repeal process was
‘subject to approval by a majority vote of [the board]’ and could not ‘supersede
the general authority of [the board] as set forth in its corporate bylaws or
applicable common law or statutes.’” (alteration in original)).
204. Id. at 698–99.
205. Id. at 703.
206. See id. at 702 n.4.
207. See id. at 712 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“I am concerned that today’s
majority opinion will encourage conflict between medical staffs and a hospital’s
board of directors.”); supra Part IV.C.
208. See supra Part IV.

